{"id":2396,"date":"2021-11-09T09:38:34","date_gmt":"2021-11-09T08:38:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eaa-online.org\/arc\/events\/joint-special-issues-corporate-disclosures-accounting-europe-and-british-accounting-review"},"modified":"2021-11-09T09:38:34","modified_gmt":"2021-11-09T08:38:34","slug":"joint-special-issues-corporate-disclosures-accounting-europe-and-british-accounting-review","status":"publish","type":"event","link":"https:\/\/eaa-online.org\/arc\/events\/joint-special-issues-corporate-disclosures-accounting-europe-and-british-accounting-review","title":{"rendered":"Joint Special Issues on Corporate Disclosures – Accounting in Europe and The British Accounting Review"},"content":{"rendered":"

In conjunction with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB<\/span>), Accounting in Europe and British Accounting Review invite submissions of papers on diverse aspects of disclosure, and drawing on diverse research methods and approaches. Successful submissions will have potential to demonstrate research impact by contributing to public policy development and in particular the regulation of financial reporting. Submissions are invited under three broad themes. Studies combining two or all themes are especially welcome:<\/p>\n

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  1. \n\t\tCompliance with Mandatory Disclosure Requirements;<\/li>\n
  2. \n\t\tSpecific Areas of Interest to the IASB;<\/li>\n
  3. \n\t\tAlternative Research Approaches.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    We outline each of these in more detail below.<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. \n\t\tCompliance with Mandatory Disclosure Requirements<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Lower levels of compliance with disclosures mandated by accounting standards generally result in less, or less meaningful, information. One strand of the literature has focused on compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements.<\/p>\n

      Theory suggests that the main reason for varying levels of compliance with disclosure requirements is preparers’ trade-off between the costs of compliance and non-compliance. There is a lack of empirical evidence to support this. Little is known, also, about how such trade-offs are operationalised and whether this differs across countries with different socio-economic environments. For instance, mandatory disclosure may be lower in environments which encourage managers’ reporting incentives to prevail (e.g, where enforcement is low or non-institutional norms encourage such behaviour), or where IFRS Standards’ adoption\/convergence is perceived as detrimental.<\/p>\n

      The operation of national and pan-national oversight and enforcement agencies, including their processes, the sanctions at their disposal, and even the relative significance they attribute to compliance, remains unexplored. We also lack evidence on how and to what extent users of financial statements actually process disclosures and whether, and to what extent, they are concerned about (non)compliance. Also, with few exceptions, the evidence we do have is limited to research using quantitative methods.<\/p>\n

      Finally, the large majority of studies (published in English) on corporate mandatory disclosures relates to disclosures mandated by the IASB. There is therefore a lack of evidence relating to disclosures mandated by other standard setters and policy makers – including those mandating rules on auditing, corporate governance, and other spheres of corporate reporting.<\/p>\n

      Possible topics under Theme A include, but are not limited to:<\/p>\n