{"id":578,"date":"2017-03-01T18:05:46","date_gmt":"2017-03-01T17:05:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eaa-online.org\/arc\/blog\/blog\/real-effects-disclosure-regulation\/"},"modified":"2017-03-01T18:05:46","modified_gmt":"2017-03-01T17:05:46","slug":"real-effects-disclosure-regulation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eaa-online.org\/arc\/blog\/2017\/03\/01\/real-effects-disclosure-regulation\/","title":{"rendered":"Real effects of disclosure regulation"},"content":{"rendered":"

Corporate disclosure regulation traditionally intends to enhance firms’ information environments, render capital markets more efficient, and improve resource allocation. Recent years have brought many examples of additional or tightening disclosure requirements – but also some rare instances of de<\/em>-regulation. However, some of these new regulatory initiatives appear different in two important respects:<\/p>\n

First, some address the needs of audiences other than capital market participants. For example, corporate social responsibility reporting targets NGOs, consumers, and the public at large.<\/p>\n

Second, several recent initiatives appear motivated by policy objectives other than<\/em> increasing transparency or comparability. Rather, they create strong incentives for firms to change non-disclosure<\/em> aspects of their operating, investing and financing policies. This new type of disclosure regulation is interesting because its “real” (i.e., non-disclosure) consequences are not unintended “side effects”, but are (sometimes explicitly) their main purpose. (Also, some of these regulatory initiatives are local or regional, and therefore likely to be understudied.)<\/p>\n

Some such regulations include:<\/p>\n